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THE IMPACT OF WILDLIFE DAMAGE ON WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS IN 
WISCONSIN 
SCOTf R. CRAVEN. Department of Wildlife Ecology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706. 
ABSTRACT: Wildlife damage caused by species nonnally managed as game animals or furbearers should be of major 
concern to wildlife managers and various user groups: hunters, trappers, and other outdoor recreationists. Real or potential 
damage may be used as an important factor in determining population levels, harvest goals, and distribution of white-tailed 
deer and Canada geese in Wisconsin. In any state where private land and agriculture are important, such a strategy could 
reduce wildlife populations and associated recreational opportunities. Recent surveys in Wisconsin have quantified I.he 
amount and distribution of deer, goose, and turkey damage in Wisconsin. These data allow comparisons between wildlife 
damage and total agricultoral production, other causes of crop loss, and the positive economic impact of these species. 
Additionally, comparisons are possible between perceived losses and maximum potential losses. A review of the problems 
caused by each animal provides a framework to discuss the issue of wildlife damage to fann crops and the implications for 
managers and resource users. The double-crested connorant provides a special example of a resource management problem 
with wildlife damage. 
Wildlife damage control has become an increasingly 
well recognized, important, and organized component of 
wildlife managemenL Several major national/international 
conferences (Vertebrate Pest Conference, Eastern Wildlife 
Damage Conference, Great Plains Wildlife Damage Confer. 
ence) are well attended, papers on the subject are well 
represented in I.he professional literature, I.he APHIS-ADC 
program has been well received, and animal damage prob-
lems, or the potential f orthem,areconsideredan integral part 
of wildlife management programs. Examples of the latter 
include concern over damage to valuable fisheries related to 
sea otter relocalions on the Pacific Coast, potential livestock 
lossesassocialed with timber wolf restoration in the northern 
Rocky Mountains, and a reconsideration of white-tailed deer 
population goals in many agricultoral areas of the Midwest· 
em and Eastern United Siates. 
In Wisconsin, wildlife damage control has become a 
major state program. Legislation created the Wisconsin 
Wildlife Damage Control Program in l 983 with an annual 
budget of about $1 million derived from a $1 surcharge on 
hwiting licenses (see Hygnstrom and Craven 1985). The 
Wisconsin Depanment of Natural Resources (WDNR) has a 
full-time animal damage coordinator, the APlllS-ADC pro-
gram has been very successful, and there have been several 
surveys iodocument the extent and characteristics of damage 
caused by key wildlife species. The result is an integrated 
program io assist fanners with damage problems through 
direct personal attention, provision of abatement materials, 
or payment of compensation. 
The initiative for the current level of assistance came 
from intensive pressure from Wisconsin's agricultural com-
munity. Wildlife managers were aware of the problems but 
lhere was no consensus as to where the financial responsibil-
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ity for wildlife damage should be placed, or even if there was 
a responsibility. In fact, damage caused by species nonnally 
managed as game animals or furbearers should be of major 
concern to wildlife managers and various user groups: 
hunters, trappers, and olher outdoor recreationists. Real or 
potential damage has become an important factor in the 
detennination of population levels, harvest goals, and distri-
bution of white-tailed deer and Canada geese in Wisconsin. 
In any state where private land and agriculture are important, 
such a strategy can lead to a reduction in wildlife populations 
and associated recreational opportunities. 
Recent surveys in Wisconsin quantified the amount and 
distribution of deer, goose, and wild torkey damage. These 
data allow comparisons between wildlife damage and total 
agricultural production, other causes of crop loss, and the 
positive economic impact of these species. Additionally 
perceived losses and maximum potential losses can be 
compared. The "fann crisis" of the 1980s apparently reduced 
the tolerance for wildlife on agricultoral lands and excessive 
publicity and misconceptions about wildlifedamage contrib-
uted to a strong negative image for some species. 
The status of an animal as a "game" species or an 
"endangered" species greatly complicates a control program. 
Unlike rodents and pest birds, such species often provide 
enormous economic and recreational opportunities. Victims 
of damage problems must contend with a general lack of 
lethal control alternatives, permits and other legal restric-
tions. 
I will use a brief review of 4 species in Wisconsin and 
related survey results to build a case for the current impor-
tance of wildlife damage control in wildlife management and 
the risk it represents to continued wildlife abundance, par-
ticularly on agricultural lands. Based on experience in 
Wisconsin, I will offer recommendations for assistance pro-
grams and education that could help restore a more favorable 
image for key wildlife species in agricultural habitat. Crea-
tive solutions to wildlife damage problems can and must offer 
alternatives to population reduction. 
The first 2 species I will review have a long history of 
problems in Wisconsin. Deer and geese are highly visible, 
well studied, and the problems associated with them are well 
publicized. Deer problems are statewide but more acute in 
central and southwestern Wisconsin. Goose problems are 
concentrated in east-central Wisconsin around Horicon 
National Wildlife Refuge. Intense publicity, strong emo-
tions, a weak farm economy, and other unique factors have 
made deer and goose damage much more complex issues than 
if they were based only on dollars lost Turkey and cormorant 
problems are very recent, more localized, and involve far 
fewer animals, but are nonetheless complex. 
Canada Geese 
Horicon Marsh is known throughout North America as a 
fall concentration point for thousands of migrating Canada 
geese Cfuiln.ta canadensis). Historically, this phenomenon 
began as recently as 1950 concurrent with the development 
of Horicon National Wildlife Refuge. The refuge area 
provided sanctuary and water and the surrounding agricul-
tural land provided abundant food resources, a situation 
similar to numerous other waterfowl refuges across the 
United States. Fall goose population levels did not exceed 
100,000 until the 1960s. The large goose "spectacle" at-
tracted thousands of tourists and hunters to the area. 
As the goose flock continued to grow throughout the 
1960s and early 1970s, farmers became increasingly dissat-
isfied with the goose management system. Crop depreda-
tions increased, changes in goose harvest management de-
prived farmers of any significant opportunity to charge 
hunters for hunting opponunity, and the relationship between 
the agricultural community and natural resource agencies 
deteriorated. Periodic demands for relief from crop depreda-
tion led to major management programs in the mid-1960s and 
1970s. For an excellent review of problems and programs 
around Horicon see Reeves et al. (1968) and Hunt (1984). 
The so-called "goose wars" of 1975-1980 led to a 
dramatic decline in the Horicon area goose population. Less 
geese resulted in lower harvest quotas and thus a reduced 
harvest. Area farmers appeared satisfied that their demands 
had been met and there were a few years of relative peace. 
The goose flock rebounded from a 20-year population 
low in 1981 to near record peak levels by 1986 and 1987 
(Table 1). Predictably, agricultural unrest increased with 
flock size. Between 1985 and 1987 we collected data on the 
positive and negative impact of the geese in rhe Horicon area. 
These data provided managers an opportunity to base deci-
sions on objective criteria 
The geese did in fact cause substantial crop losses. In 
both 1985 and 1986 farmers reported losses of about $1.6 
million. Within 10-20 km of Horicon refuge, 43% of the 
farmers felt their losses were unacceptable. Crops most 
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Table 1. Wisconsin Canada Goose Harvest Statistics, 1980-
1987. 
Year Harvest1 
1980 57.6 
1981 39.8 
1982 45.8 
1983 33.5 
1984 39.9 
1985 43.3 
1986 49.9 
1987 
December 
population 
(thousands)2 
367 
251 
304 
353 
480 
619 
515 
568 
1 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Survey Data. 
Harvest 
quota 
30 
20 
18 
25 
25 
25 
45 
49.5 
• U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service a>IDll of Canada geese in Mississippi Valley 
Population range. 
frequently damaged were alfalfa, winter wheat, and com, and 
damage took several forms in addition to direct consumption. 
Data suggested that tolerance for goose damage was much 
less than that reponed for deer damage. In 1985, about half 
of the area farmers believed that an incr~e in rhe goose 
harvest would lead to a decrease in crop damage. About half 
of those individuals changed !heir minds in 1986 after a near 
doubling of the harvest quota. However, note in Table 1 rhat 
the actual harvest did not reflect the increased quota. 
On the other side of the ledger, interviews with tourists, 
car counters, and roadside observations indicated that 160-
180 thousand people visited the Horicon area in 1986 and 
1987 to see geese and other marsh wildlife. Visitors traveled 
an average of 102 miles, one-way and collectively spent 
about $2 million in the area. A mail-back questionnaire to 
area businesses suggested total. expenditures by goose watch-
ers and hunters of almost $7 million. 
Farmers did not recognize the economic value of the 
goose flock to the Horicon area; probably because they do not 
share in the economic benefits. 
In 1988 the damage issue remains rhe key factor in goose 
management decisions. The trend is toward increased har-
vestquotasand a decrease in the goose population at Horicon. 
History suggests that this approach has done little more than 
contribute to a cyclic outbreak of problems. Fonunately, 
there are signs that other programs such as the effective 
response of the new APHIS-ADC abatement program at 
Horicon, a new APHIS-ADC winter wheat "lure crop" proj-
ect, a popular hunter/farmer referral system, and the financial 
resources of the 1983 Wisconsin Wildlife Damage Program 
mayprovidealong-termsolutioniolheproblemslhathave Table 3. Wisconsin Deer Damage Compared with 1983 
plagued Horicon. Value of Crops Raised 
White-tailed Deer 
Excellent habitat, especially in areas of mixed wood-
lands and agriculwral lands, a series of mild-to-moderate 
winters, and conservative harvests led to an increase in the 
deer herd to about 1 million animals by 1985 (Table 2). 
Complaints increased as deer caused substantial losses to 
com, fruit, alfalfa, and other farm products. During 1983-84 
Slatewide damage was estimated at $36.7 million (Table 3). 
Losses represented only 1.4% of iotal Wisconsin agricultural 
production for that period. Over half the total damage was to 
com and 55% of all Wisconsin farms reported com damage 
(averageloss$438perfarm). Despi!eavarietyofabatement 
and compensation programs, damage continued at intoler-
able levels for some Canners. 
ln another context the whiie-tailed deer is probably the 
most popular and important wild animal in Wisconsin. 
During the annual 9-day November gun deer hunting season 
6S0-750thousandhuotersinvadeWisconsin's31,000square 
miles of deer range. Recent harvests have ranged from 250-
300 lhousand deer. Hunter expenditures, meat and hide 
values, and license sales exceed $200 million (U.S. Fish and 
Table 2. Wisconsin White-tailed Deer Harvest Statistics, 
1982-1987. 
9-day Deer 
gun season herd Number of 
Year harvest' status special tags2 
1982 182,700 increasing 126,505 
1983 197,600 increasing 165,967 
1984 255,900 increasing 194,906 
1985 274,300 1 million+ 279,890 
1986 259.200 950,000 234,425 
1987 250,100 l million 261,280 
1 Wisconsin Deptmncnt of Na111ral Re.sources Sttt.istics. 
i ·aumers Choice" or""..a\Jcrless only"' tags, basic season is budts only. 
Wildlife Service, 1985 Survey data). The benefits of a long 
archery hunting season and lhe aeslhetic value of observing 
deer add unknown amounts to these figures. 
In Wisconsin, deer are managed in 96 deer management 
units averaging about 580 square miles in size. The popula-
lion goal for each unit is set based on a delicate balance 
between opposing needs: the need to minimize crop damage 
and deer-car collisions on the one hand; the need to maximize 
hunting opportunity and non-consumptive values on the 
odler. Once set, thepopulationgoalsareachieved by setting 
barvestquotasforeachunil Thenumberofdeerofeachsex 
II 
1983 Crop Value Value of Percent damage 
Crop (in millions)' deer damage' by deer 
All Crops 2540.0 36.7 1.4 
Com 991.6 20.6 2.1 
Hay 902.8 7.2 0.8 
Soybeans 104.1 1.5 1.4 
Oats 81.1 1.7 2.1 
Apples 8.7 0.2 2.3 
Vegetables 245.0 1.1 0.4 
1 Wisconsin Agriculture Reporting Service. 
'Ocwber 1983-Sq>Wnber 1984S1m'cy Data. 
!hat need to be harvested is calculated and hunting regula-
tions are set accordingly. For an excellent review of deer 
management in Wisconsin see Creed et al. (1984). 
The system just described has been very successful but 
the impact of an adjustment in the population goal-setting 
procedure is obvious. A move toward crop damage reduction 
by deer population reduction affects recreational opportunity 
and vice versa. Survey data indicated that in agricultural 
arcaswithhighdeerdensities,34-57%ofthefarmersfavored 
a decrease in herd size. In the same areas, 9-27% reported 
substantial-to-severe damage and 9-33% felt damage levels 
were unreasonable. The result has been a major management 
effort to reevaluate population goals in predominantly agri-
cultural areas. Herd reduction via increased harvests began 
about 1982 and 1983 and culminated with record numbers of 
special tags w take more deer (especially antlerless animals) 
in 1985-87 (Table 2). As expected, the overall harvest began 
a slow decline in 1986. 
Cormorants 
The double-crested cormorant<Pbalacrocorax fillii1IW is 
notagamebirdbutthespeciesdoesillusttateanotherdiflicult 
problem for wildlife management. Historically, cormorant 
populations in the Great Lakes region fluctuated widely. In 
1972, with a population of only 66 pairs in 3 colonies, the 
double-crested cormorant was listed as an endangered spe-
cies in Wisconsin. In addition to !he protection afforded to 
an endangered species, managers took steps to increase the 
cormorant population. A total of 794 nesting platforms (see 
Meier 1981} were erected on islands in Green Bay and at 
several inland waters colonies during the 1970s. Because of 
these, and perhaps other reasons, cormorant populations 
increased rapidly, especially in Green Bay and in the Apostle 
Islands on Lake Superior. By 1985 there were at least 2,217 
nesting pairs in 22 colonies, 1,127 in Green Bay alone. 
As the cormorant populations increased so did com-
plaints from commercial fishermen in both Green Bay and the 
Apostle Islands. Fishermen claimed substantial losses of 
yellow perch and whitefish to direct consumption by cormo-
rants and to gilling and scarring of captured fish when 
cormorams fed freely within the large pound net traps 
commonly used (Craven and Lev 1987). Practical abatement 
techniques were not available and the cormorants could not 
be killed because of their status as an endangered spe.cies. 
In 1986 the cormorant was delisted. Artificial nesting 
structures in Green Bay were all lost to weather and high 
water levels or were removed. The Lower Green Bay Action 
Plan, a broad environmental plan for Green Bay, suggests that 
nothing be done to encourage cormorant populations. The 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has issued permits to commer-
cial fishermen to control (kill) problem birds. To date, no 
birds have been shot. During the summer of 1987, on 
Gravelly island not far from the mouth of Green Bay, 
unidentified intrudersdestroyed hundreds of cormorant eggs. 
There is now some indication that the Wisconsin cormorant 
population may be slabilizing (S. Matteson, WDNR, pers. 
comm.). 
Turkeys 
The wild turkey (Meleagris gallQpavo) was extirpated 
from Wisconsin during the late 1800s. Repeated attempts to 
reintroduce turkeys during the mid 1900s met with limited or 
no success. However, in 1974 the WDNR and Missouri 
Deparunent of Conservation agreed on a program that would 
send Wisconsin ruffed grouse CBonasa umbellus) to Missouri 
in exchange for wild-trapped Missouri turkeys. Wild stock 
proved to be the key to success. The first release of 45 
Missouri turkeys took place in the heavily wooded drifdess 
region of southwestern Wisconsin in 1976. In just over a 
decade, continued release and relocations, coupled with 
natural population growth and range expansion, produced a 
turkey flock estimated at 25-40,000 birds. . 
The return of wild turkeys was hailed as a tremendous 
success for wildlife management. Limited hunting began in 
1983 and increased to include 11,000 participants during the 
1988 spring season. Landowners were very receptive to the 
presence of turkeys and in many cases were very protective 
of the initial flocks. 
By 1987 there were indications that the positive feeling 
toward the turkey program had changed. Hunters, woodland 
owners, and the general public remained enthusiastic but the 
agricultural community began to react in terms of"too many" 
turkeys and problems with crop damage. Local DNR offices 
began to receive complaints about turkey damage in alfalfa, 
com, and small grains. The literature and personal commu-
nication offered no indication that turkeys caused serious 
problems anywhere in primary turkey range. Field investiga-
tions of complaints were inconclusive. 
We conducted a random mail-back questionnaire survey 
of 508 farmers in the 6 Wisconsin counties with highest 
turkey densities in December 1987 and January 1988. A 
preliminary analysis suggests that about 25% of the area 
fanners perceive turkeys as a "medium" to "large" problem. 
Only 3 of262 respondents reported damage in excessof$500. 
Most farmers with damage considered it to be "minor" or 
"moderate" and less than $100. These data do not suggest a 
major financial problem. However, virtually all farmers 
reported an increasing turkey flock and about half equate 
more turkeys with more damage. Farmers reported vinually 
no individual efforts to abate turkey damage. 
When offered a choice of solutions to the turkey prob-
lem, about 60% of the farmers favored a fall hunting season 
for turkeys of any sex or age. The implication was clear that 
farmers wanted a reduction in the turkey flock. The WDNR 
response was to consider a limited fall season as early as 1989. 
I have attempted to present a brief overview of 4 very 
complicated wildlife damage problems in Wisconsin which 
involve species not traditionally considered "vertebrate 
pests." A key reference was provided in each case if the reader 
desires more detail. In addition, several papers in production 
will expand on the problems and data related to turkey, geese, 
and deer. In all 4 cases populations of an animal with 
important recreational or social value were (or will be) 
reduced in response to economic loss to one sector of society. 
Intuitively, reduced populations should reduce damage but 
this relationship does not appear to be well established. 
Further, population reductions could reduceopponunities for 
successful harvest or non-consumptive activities. 
There are several important issues to consider: 
First, the severity ofloss versus the value of the wildlife. 
As noted for deer and geese the positive economic impact of 
these species far exceeds the total damage they cause. For 
deer and geese, sociologists and economists in Wisconsin 
report that there is substantial additional "surplus value" 
associated with both species (Heberlein and Bishop 1986). In 
other words hunters and other user groups would be willing 
to expend far more for their recreation than they actuaJly do. 
Second, the numberoffarmers affected. There can be no 
question that some farmers suffer disastrous losses to wild-
life. However, repeated surveys suggest that severe losses are 
restricted to a small perceniage of all farmers. In fact, in many 
cases, farmers report small or n_o losses, tolerance for minor 
problems, and enjoyment of the wildlife in question. There 
is no consensus. Media attention focuses on voCal farmers 
with severe losses with a resultant public impression of a 
universal problem. 
Third, problems with reported losses. Surveys ulti-
mately lead to a bottom line of total damage caused by a 
species for area X over time Y. At first glance the figure seems 
very large (i.e., $1.6 million for goose damage) and impos-
sible to compensate for. In reality, such a figure represents 
perceived loss. Real loss could be more or less. With Canada 
geese at Horicon Marsh a crude model which incorporated 
the number of geese, length of stay, daily consumption, food 
habits and a few basic assumptions suggested a maximum 
real loss ofless than half of the $1.6 million figure. Further-
more, a survey "total" includes many small claims for which 
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fanners report some tolerance. 
The basic problem remains the presence of wildlife, a 
publicly "owned" resource on private land. The wildlife 
resourcehasgreatvalueandsocietyexpectsprivatelandown· 
ers, including fanners, to be responsible stewards of the 
resource. However,thereisliuleornoincentiveforlandown-
ers to do just that unless their personal interests happen to 
mesh with those of society. Surveys strongly suggest that if 
farmers do not share in the economic benefits derived from 
wildlife they do not even recognize them as valid. In the case 
of wildlife damage society often expects the private land-
owner to sustain the damage or lake personal steps to abate 
iL That system has not been successful and the resource 
ultimately loses ground; society will in turn lose opportuni-
ties derived from wildlife. 
The answer is neither singular nor simple. l offer the 
following observations: 
(1) The value of key wildlife species suggests that a 
greater public inveslment in wildlife management, including 
damage control, is certainly justified. 
(2) In the case of a species restoration program like the 
double-crested cormorant, potential damage problems must 
be anticipated. A program for dealing with damage should be 
in hand before the program proceeds. 
(3) The "gut objection" of some managers and resource 
users to financial compensation for wildlife damage must be 
overcome. Survey data strongly suggest that farmer toler-
ance, possible differences between perceived and real dam-
age, and relatively low numbers of farmers with serious 
problems,allcontribute to a substantial reduction in the "total 
loss" figures often used in discussions of wildlife damage. 
Thus the burden of compensation is not as staggering as it 
may appear at fU'Sl glance. An upturn in the farm economy 
would undoubtedly help the situation. 
(4) The Wisconsin program, which emphasizes cost· 
shared abatement first and compensation only after abate-
ment fails or is judged impractical, has proven very success-
ful. A one time or periodic inves1men1 ineffective abatement 
makes more sense than perennial compensation payments. 
(5) Damage problems caused by key wildlife species are 
very different than traditional pest problems and deserve 
critical and innovative attention in the pest and wildlife 
management communities-which in practice should be one 
{"·" ... 
($-<'l 
""""',.,,,.,;.; 
:'" 
-,, 
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and the same. 
(6) In agricullllral areas.especially in the Eastern United 
States where most land is in private ownership, the land-
owner/farmermust be brought into the economics of wildlife. 
The production of wildlife on private farmland is no more a 
free process than the production of beef or pork. 
In summary, some hard management decisions will be 
necessary to maintain wildlife abundance in agricultural 
areas. The altemaliveis to reduce populations to levels where 
there are not problems. Ultimately no wildlife equals no 
problems, but for wildlife managers and users that equation 
is in«>lerable. We need to give compensation a better look, 
seek out adequate funding, continue development of better 
abatement tools, and develop a creative way to make farmers 
a full partner in wildlife management 
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